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Summary Table 
 
 
2009 2010 2011(f) 2012(f) 
     
 OUTPUT     
 (Real Annual Growth %)     
 Private Consumer Expenditure -6.9 -0.8 -1.3  0.0   
 Public Net Current Expenditure -4.5 -3.8 -3.3  -4.0   
 Investment -28.7 -24.9 -6.7  -2.8   
 Exports -4.2 6.3 7.0 7.4 
 Imports -9.3 2.7 4.9  5.8 
 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) -7.0 -0.4 1.8  2.3   
 Gross National Product (GNP) -9.8 0.3  0.2 0.7   
     
 PRICES     
 (Annual Growth %)     
 Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) -1.7 -1.6 1.3 1.0  
 Consumer Price Index (CPI) -4.5 -1.0 3.0 1.0  
 Wage Growth -0.8 -2.9  0.0  1.0  
     
 LABOUR MARKET     
 Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 1,929 1,848 1,803 1,815 
 Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 259 292 300 310 
 Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 11.8 13.6 14.3 14.5 
     
 PUBLIC FINANCE     
 Exchequer Balance (€m) -24.6 -18.7 -17.3 -14.5 
 General Government Balance (€m) -23.0 -49.9 -22.4 -11.4   
 General Government Balance (% of GDP) -14.3 -32.0 -14.2   -7.1          
     Excluding once off bank bailout monies -11.8 -11.5 -9.3 -7.1     
 General Government Debt (% of GDP) 65.2 94.9 104 109 
 
1 
Summary 
 
The international economy is in a period of great uncertainty. On both sides of 
the Atlantic, governments are faced with difficult choices regarding levels of debt. 
In the United States, this has led to the first ever downgrading of sovereign debt 
by a major ratings agency. In Europe, governments have agreed major changes to 
the mechanism for bailing out troubled eurozone countries, although financial 
markets are not convinced that this is enough. While this agreement has brought 
about improved terms for Ireland’s bailout, and thus made the road to fiscal 
sustainability easier, the issue of burden sharing remains to be addressed. At 
present the cost of the restructuring of the covered banking system has primarily 
been borne by Ireland, even though the benefits of this restructuring are shared 
throughout the eurozone. 
 
Activity in the domestic economy is expected to remain depressed this year, with 
GNP growing by 0.2 per cent and GDP growing by 1.8 per cent. Growth may pick 
up in 2012, with GNP growing by 0.7 per cent and GDP by 2.3 per cent. The 
stimulus for growth is coming from the export sector as domestic producers seek 
to replace lost domestic demand with new business from abroad, while the 
multinational sector continues to perform well on global markets. Despite the 
difficulties being faced in the international economy, we predict that exports 
from indigenous firms will increase 7.5 per cent in volume terms, both this year 
and next. There is also an expansion of capacity underway in both the 
multinational manufacturing and services exports sectors. Overall, we expect the 
volume of exports of goods and services to increase by 7.0 per cent in 2011 and 
7.4 per cent in 2012. 
 
Forecasts of domestic demand have been scaled back in this Commentary as a 
result of a deterioration in the factors determining household consumption. The 
household savings rate remains elevated in the face of great uncertainty – 
uncertainty about the future global and domestic economic climate and about 
the impact of future domestic budgets. Our forecast inflation rate is now 1.3 per 
cent and consequently, we expect consumption to fall by 1.3 per cent this year, 
but may remain constant in 2012.  
 
There remains an overhang of excess housing, office space and commercial space 
that is expected to depress investment over the coming years. The completion of 
the road-building programme will also act as a drag on building and construction 
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investment, which is unlikely to be replaced by any big-ticket infrastructure 
projects in the near future. In contrast, investment in manufacturing and 
agriculture is expected to expand this year following several years of decline. 
Overall, investment is expected to fall by 6.7 per cent this year, and 2.8 per cent 
in 2012. 
 
Unemployment is expected to remain high. The collapse in output in the 
construction sector has created a major structural unemployment problem. The 
full scale of this problem is difficult to gauge as a significant number of workers in 
this sector were from overseas, and the extent to which these migrants have 
since left the country. Current trends in employment and unemployment are not 
encouraging. We expect unemployment will average 14.3 per cent this year, and 
could be even higher next year unless there is significant outward migration. 
 
In addition to the cost of restructuring the banking system, the public finances 
have suffered due to the deterioration of taxation revenue following the collapse 
of the bubble. Expenditure has yet to reduce to match this new reality.  Reducing 
the consequent large deficit has proven difficult, and has necessitated spending 
cuts, increased service charges, public sector pay cuts, and tax increases. The 
danger is that some good programmes will be cut because this is less challenging 
than cutting others that yield less benefit. 
 
In the General Assessment, we consider four interconnected imbalances that are 
currently acting to depress the economy: the restructuring of the banking system, 
the fiscal deficit, private sector deleveraging, and structural unemployment. 
These problems could be alleviated by a resumption of economic growth, which 
can only be achieved by greater competitiveness and growing domestic 
confidence. Recent indications that government is planning to make explicit the 
changes in taxation and expenditure that are required to effect the fiscal 
consolidation over the next few years are very welcome. 
 
 3 
 NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2010 (Estimate) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 2009 2010 Change in 2010 
 Estimate Estimate % 
 €bn €bn Value Price Volume 
      
 Private Consumer Expenditure 85.2  82.6 -3.1 -2.3 -0.8 
 Public Net Current Expenditure 28.5 26.2 -8.0 -4.3 -3.8 
 Gross Fixed Capital Formation 25.3 18.1 -28.5 -4.8 -24.9 
 Exports of Goods and Services (X) 145.9 157.7 8.1 1.7 6.3 
 Physical Changes in Stocks -2.3 -0.9 - - - 
      
 Final Demand 282.6 283.7 0.4 -0.5 0.9 
 less:      
 Imports of Goods and Services (M) 121.0 127.9 5.7 2.9 2.7 
      
 Statistical Discrepancy 1.0 -0.2 - - - 
      
 GDP at Market Prices 160.6 156.0 -2.9 -2.4 -0.4 
 less:      
 Net Factor Payments (F) 28.4 27.8 - - - 
      
 GNP at Market Prices 132.2 128.2 -3.0 -3.3 0.3 
 
 B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
 2009 2010 Change in 2010  
 Estimate Estimate    
 €bn €bn €bn  %  
      
 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2.2 2.7 0.5 24.9  
 Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 73.6 68.8 -4.9 -6.6  
  Other: 49.5 53.2 3.7 7.5  
 Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 1.0 -0.3 - -  
 Statistical Discrepancy 1.0 -0.2 - -  
      
 Net Domestic Product 127.3 124.2 -3.2 -2.5  
 less:      
 Net Factor Payments 28.4 27.8 0.6 -  
      
 National Income 99.0 96.4 -2.6 -2.6  
 Depreciation 17.3 16.1 -1.2 -  
      
 GNP at Factor Cost 116.2 112.4 -3.8 -3.3  
 Taxes less Subsidies 16.0 15.8 -0.2 -  
      
 GNP at Market Prices 132.2 128.2 -4.0 -3.0  
 
 C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 2009 2010 Change in 2010  
 Estimate Estimate    
 €bn €bn €bn  
     
 Exports (X) less Imports (M) 24.9 29.8 +4.9  
 Net Factor Payments (F) -28.4 -27.8 -0.6  
 Net Transfers -1.2 -1.2 0.0  
     
 Balance on Current Account -4.7 0.8 +5.5  
 as % of GNP -3.6 0.6 +4.2  
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 FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2011  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 2010 2011 Change in 2011 
 Estimate Estimate % 
 €bn €bn Value Price Volume 
      
 Private Consumer Expenditure 82.6 82.5 -0.1 1.3 -1.3 
 Public Net Current Expenditure 26.2 25.4 -3.0 0.3 -3.3 
 Gross Fixed Capital Formation 18.1 16.7 -7.8 -1.1 -6.7 
 Exports of Goods and Services (X) 157.7 168.8 7.0 0.0 7.0 
 Physical Changes in Stocks -0.9 -0.5 - - - 
      
 Final Demand 283.7 292.9 3.2 0.4 2.8 
 less:      
 Imports of Goods and Services (M) 127.9 135.9 6.2 1.3 4.9 
      
 Statistical Discrepancy -0.2 -0.1 - - - 
      
 GDP at Market Prices 156.0 157.2 0.7 -1.1 1.8 
 less:      
 Net Factor Payments (F) 27.8 30.4 - - - 
      
 GNP at Market Prices 128.2 126.7 -1.1 -1.3 0.2 
 
 
 
 
 B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
 2010 2011 Change in 2011  
 Estimate Forecast    
 €bn €bn €bn %  
      
 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2.7 3.0 0.3 9.8  
 Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 68.8 67.4 -1.4 -2.0  
  Other: 53.2 55.8 2.6 4.9  
 Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.3 -0.3 - -  
 Statistical Discrepancy -0.2 -0.1 - -  
      
 Net Domestic Product 124.2 125.8 1.6 1.3  
 less:      
 Net Factor Payments 27.8 30.4 2.6 -  
      
 National Income 96.4 95.4 -1.0 -1.0  
 Depreciation 16.1 15.0 -1.0 -  
      
 GNP at Factor Cost 112.4 110.4 -2.1 -1.8  
 Taxes less Subsidies 15.8 16.4 0.6 -  
      
 GNP at Market Prices 128.2 126.7 -1.5 -1.1  
 
 
 
 
 
 C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 2010 2011 Change in 2011  
 Estimate Forecast    
 €bn €bn €bn  
     
 Exports (X) less Imports (M) 29.8 32.9 3.1  
 Net Factor Payments (F) -27.8 -30.4 -2.6  
 Net Transfers -1.2 -1.0 0.2  
     
 Balance on Current Account 0.8 1.5 0.7  
 as % of GNP 0.6 1.2  0.6  
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 FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2012  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 2011 2012 Change in 2012 
 Estimate Estimate % 
 €bn €bn Value Price Volume 
      
 Private Consumer Expenditure 82.5 83.4 1.0 1.0 0.0 
 Public Net Current Expenditure 25.4 24.4 -4.0 0.0 -4.0 
 Gross Fixed Capital Formation 16.7 16.2 -2.6 0.2 -2.8 
 Exports of Goods and Services (X) 168.8 182.4 8.1 0.6 7.4 
 Physical Changes in Stocks -0.5 0.0 - - - 
      
 Final Demand 292.9 306.5 4.6 0.7 3.9 
 less:      
 Imports of Goods and Services (M) 135.9 145.5 7.1 1.2 5.8 
      
 Statistical Discrepancy -0.1 -0.1 - - - 
      
 GDP at Market Prices 157.2 161.1 2.5 0.2 2.3 
 less:      
 Net Factor Payments (F) 30.4 33.4 - - - 
      
 GNP at Market Prices 126.7 127.6 0.7 0.0 0.7 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
 2011 2012 Change in 2012  
 Estimate Forecast    
 €bn €bn €bn %  
      
 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 3.0 3.3 0.3 10   
 Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 67.4 68.5 1.1 1.6  
  Other: 55.8 58.2 2.4 4.3  
 Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.3 -0.3 - -  
 Statistical Discrepancy -0.1 -0.1 - -  
      
 Net Domestic Product 125.8 129.5 3.8 3.0   
 less:      
 Net Factor Payments 30.4 33.4 -3.0 -  
      
 National Income 95.4 96.1 0.7 0.8  
 Depreciation 15.0 14.1 -1.0 -  
      
 GNP at Factor Cost 110.4 110.2 -0.2 -0.2  
 Taxes less Subsidies 16.4 17.5 1.1 -  
      
 GNP at Market Prices 126.7 127.6 0.9 0.7   
 
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 2011 2012 Change in 2012  
 Estimate Forecast    
 €bn €bn €bn  
     
 Exports (X) less Imports (M) 32.9 36.9 4.0  
 Net Factor Payments (F) -30.4 -33.4 -3.0  
 Net Transfers -1.0 -1.0 0.0  
     
 Balance on Current Account 1.5 2.5 1.0  
 as % of GNP 1.2 2.0 0.8  
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1. Introduction  
 
 
DOMESTIC IMBALANCES 
In the Spring Quarterly Economic Commentary, we described an economy in 
transition from one that was over-reliant on the domestic construction industry, 
to an economy that is orientated towards export demand. This transition is still 
underway, but a return to growth led by external demand is being frustrated by a 
global slowdown and several domestic imbalances; the structural unemployment 
problem created by the collapse of the construction industry, mounting public 
debt created by bubble-era expenditure and recession-era tax revenue, the 
ongoing restructuring of the troubled banking system, and the deleveraging of 
private sector debt.  Taken together these factors will keep economic growth well 
below potential over the forecast horizon. 
 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
As well as the very difficult domestic situation, the international situation we now 
find ourselves in is increasingly challenging. The recent downgrading of US debt, 
the concerns about Italy’s and Spain’s level of debt, and the lack of clarity about 
the details of the revised terms of the bailout agreement covering Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal, have caused major turmoil in financial markets and increased the 
uncertainty that faces consumers, producers and governments. The financial 
turmoil requires a speedy and coherent solution, not just determined by 
governments but informed by market participants. If this does not happen, the 
uncertainty could easily spill over into corporate and household decision making 
– already in a fragile state – and cause developed economies to tip back into 
negative growth. 
 
Against the background of global uncertainty, there have been other 
developments since the Spring Quarterly Economic Commentary that have been 
positive for Ireland. The most important of these developments has been the 
recent modification of the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) bailout 
mechanism as it applies to all programme countries, including Ireland, in 
response to the continuing crisis in Greece and worries about the financial health 
of Italy and Spain. The changes are very favourable to Ireland and ease the 
burden and timing of the required fiscal adjustment as well as significantly 
reducing the uncertainty in relation to a return to financial markets by the State. 
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The change in the conditions facing Ireland arising from the 21st July Statement by 
the Heads of State/Government in the eurozone on interest rates and 
lengthening the maturity of the bailout loans is a step in the right direction. The 
effect of the reduction in interest rates is to save approximately €1 billion per 
year when the loans are fully taken up, though somewhat less initially. This eases 
the adjustment of the public finances and should permit a return to a balanced 
budget earlier than might otherwise have occurred. The lengthening of the 
maturity increases the flexibility of government when facing the rollover of debt. 
If government is in a position to return to financial markets at more favourable 
rates then the bailout loans can be repaid earlier. There remain important 
elements of the new agreement that are yet to be finalised, but the general 
shape is clear.  
 
The revised agreement allows for the possibility of debt buy-backs by the EFSF 
and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in secondary markets, depending 
on economic circumstances. This creates the possibility of debt reduction but the 
very existence of this facility, which effectively improves the liquidity of 
government debt, may limit the extent of buy-backs and bring market rates closer 
to bailout rates. This facility is likely to be important in circumstances where a 
renewal of uncertainty in financial markets leads to yields on government paper 
rising again to the very high levels reached from early July to the time of the new 
agreement.  
 
The final element in the revised agreement that is of benefit to Ireland derives 
from the statement that “We are determined to continue to provide support to 
countries under programmes until they have regained market access, provided 
they successfully implement these programmes”. The significance of this is that 
the debt rollover of €12 billion due in early 2014 can be successfully financed, 
either by market access or by funding through the EFSF/ESM. In the Spring 
Quarterly Economic Commentary we expressed concern about the scale of the 
rollover while the country was still running a very large budget deficit and while 
there was some doubt about private sector debt reductions whether voluntary or 
not. These two factors suggested that a return to financial markets to finance the 
deficit and rollover was unlikely. Hence, at that time, we were in favour of a 
reduced timetable for deficit reduction. This new agreement has fundamentally 
changed our view about the necessary speed of adjustment. The lower interest 
rates allow a smaller budget deficit than the target 3 per cent by 2015. It has 
been argued1 that Ireland should move more rapidly on fiscal adjustment in order 
                                                            
1
  Philip Lane “Swift fiscal adjustment could hasten recovery” Irish Times, July 29 2011. 
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to establish in the minds of market participants that the debt is sustainable and 
that consequently there will be no burden sharing with private holders of 
sovereign debt. It is hoped that this will allow earlier access to financial markets. 
This argument has much to recommend it and we believe that the deficit target 
could be reduced to 1.5 per cent by 2015. If, by 2015, regaining market access is 
difficult for whatever reason, then going above and beyond the bailout terms 
strengthens the case for support as quoted above. 
 
While the agreement was much more favourable than many had expected, there 
are still unresolved issues in relation to burden sharing, the overall level of 
indebtedness of member countries in the eurozone, and the evolution of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) in to a more classic central bank, albeit without a 
central government backstop. Taking the first of these issues, there are very 
significant differences between the causes of the financial crisis in different 
countries. In the case of Ireland a significant element of the level of debt and the 
amount borrowed year-by-year is a direct consequence of the banking collapse 
and inappropriate fiscal policy during the boom when policy should have been 
contractionary, whereas for other indebted nations it is primarily a reflection of 
fiscal mismanagement, with the emergence of permanent deficits.  There are 
potential spillover effects to other countries in the monetary union of the 
financial crisis in Ireland and these argue for an approach that recognises this. At 
present the cost of the restructuring of the banking system has been reflected in 
increased indebtedness by the State, even as the benefits of this restructuring are 
more widely shared throughout the eurozone. In a monetary union with the 
necessary fiscal authorities, burden sharing would be the norm, recognising the 
interdependence between the different elements of the monetary union. The 
eurozone lacks this central fiscal authority so that the efforts to resolve this 
unprecedented crisis are fragmented. Over time we may move to an approach 
that involves burden sharing at the eurozone level and this would ease the 
burden on Ireland.  
 
A more intractable problem remains the level of indebtedness of some members 
of the eurozone. The recent uncertainty in financial markets in relation to Spain 
and Italy highlights the need for greater urgency in reducing their debt/GDP 
ratios. As recent experience shows, debt/GDP ratios rise very quickly when 
output in an economy falls below potential. When economies are performing 
well, it is not enough to merely stabilise the debt/GDP ratio, as, if the debt/GDP 
ratio remains high, governments will have very little flexibility in the face of a 
downturn. The experience of recent years with Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain 
and now Italy argues for new rules of governance within the eurozone, both at 
the centre and between the centre and individual governments. 
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Finally, and this is a point we noted in the Spring Quarterly Economic 
Commentary, the ECB needs to be much more active in primary and secondary 
markets for government debt. Some initial steps have been taken in this 
direction, but the policy shift needs a strategic underpinning, rather than a 
grudging acceptance of an unwanted role. Otherwise the financial instability in 
the eurozone will continue. This is a major and unprecedented crisis that requires 
radical thinking to find a solution. A set of piecemeal actions that seem to 
maintain the status quo is not a sustainable option. 
 
The forecasts in this Commentary are framed in the light of the current 
uncertainty. The risks are all on the downside. The openness of the economy is a 
strength in an upturn, but a weakness in a contracting world economy.
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2. Exports of Goods and 
Services 
 
 
EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES IN 2011 AND 2012 
Merchandise exports increased by 6 per cent in value in 2010. The value of 
exports from the modern sector increased by 4 per cent, while the value of 
exports from the traditional sector rose by 12.5 per cent. Data for the first 6 
months of 2011 indicate that merchandise exports have continued to grow 
rapidly, and are 8.5 per cent higher than in the same period in 2010. However, a 
direct comparison between 2010 and 2011 at a detailed level is complicated by a 
change in the treatment of exports from Shannon Free Zone. Prior to this year 
such exports were included in SITC 9 “Commodities and transactions not 
classified elsewhere”, but they have now been redistributed into the relevant 
SITC division. As a consequence, a direct comparison between 2010 and 2011 at a 
disaggregated level is no longer possible. Hence, we are not in a position illustrate 
the distinction between multinational and indigenous exports in the current year, 
though that distinction is important. In the Spring Commentary the growth in 
exports from indigenous companies replacing lost domestic demand by exporting 
was identified as an important source of growth, helping to replace some of the 
lost domestic demand resulting from the fiscal contraction and the increase in 
the personal savings rate. This is still important but we must rely on other sources 
of data to capture what is happening. Production data show that in the first half 
of 2011 the volume of output from the modern sector increased by about 1.3 per 
cent while output from the traditional sector rose by almost 2.4 and somewhat 
more if construction related manufacturing is excluded. Given that it is unlikely 
that domestic demand has expanded, this suggests that exports from the 
traditional sector have continued to grow, with the possible exception of the 
drinks subsector where output and exports have been relatively unchanged. The 
Irish Exporters Association expects an increase in food and drink exports of about 
8 per cent this year and the Enterprise Ireland Survey of Companies puts this at 
above 10 per cent. However, exports from the indigenous sector are more likely 
to be affected by changes in world income and trade and these appear to have 
weakened in the first half of the year, with the recovery in the US stalling amid 
continuing uncertainty about the budget deficit and the permitted level of overall 
debt, and slower growth than anticipated in the UK as the budget measures there 
take effect. Uncertainty about the performance of both these economies could 
damage general sentiment in the world economy and return the developed 
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economies back into recession. This suggests a degree of caution in forecasting 
exports by traditional firms, but a volume increase of 7.5 per cent this year and 
next still looks realistic. 
 
The composition of modern sector exports, with the heavy emphasis on 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals, suggests that supply capacity is critical in 
determining exports from the modern sector. The additions to capacity over the 
past years are expected to lead to further increases in output and sales this year 
and next. There is a very high degree of concentration in this sector, with one 
firm alone accounting for one-tenth of total merchandise exports. The critical 
issues are the extent to which investment continues and firms adapt to products 
going out of patent and the scale of mergers and acquisitions currently 
underway. Given that the sector in Ireland is still primarily production rather than 
research based and much of the economies sought from mergers and acquisitions 
to date have been driven by a desire to reduce research costs, as well as 
overheads and to improve research outcomes, the production side located in 
Ireland has mostly not been negatively impacted. The effect of the expiry of 
patents is more difficult to foresee. There will certainly be reductions in the value 
of output and perhaps in the level of output, but firms with products coming out 
of patent have adopted strategies that compete at all levels of the generic market 
to ensure that there is not a complete loss of markets. They have also continued 
to develop new products, and this has resulted in increased investment in the 
sector in Ireland. The greatest threat to pharmaceutical exports is likely to come 
from changes to reimbursement methods for healthcare expenditure in some 
countries struggling with fiscal deficits. On balance we think modern sector 
exports will continue to grow this year.  
 
Overall merchandise exports could grow in value terms by 6 per cent.  
 
Exports of services are now of equal importance to the export sector as 
merchandise exports. There is a much higher degree of concentration in this 
sector than in merchandise exports, with the top 10 companies accounting for 
just under 50 per cent of exports of services (excluding tourism). During 2011 
there have been announcements of additions to existing firms and some new 
firms have established here. We expect continued growth in output from this 
sector of about 8 per cent this year and slightly less in 2012. 
 
The number of tourists coming to Ireland peaked in 2007 and then declined for 
three years, with the 2010 level 25 per cent below that in 2007. In the fourth 
quarter of 2010 the numbers, seasonally corrected, rose, though they were still 
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over 2 per cent below the level of the same quarter of 2010. In the first half of 
this year the numbers increased again and were 12.7 per cent above the 
corresponding half of 2010. In the second quarter the growth was particularly 
strong, but the 2010 numbers were adversely affected by the ash cloud which 
reduced air travel. The UK market remains problematic and the increase in 
numbers from the UK is low relative to the increase from other markets. At this 
stage the number of overseas tourists visiting Ireland could rise in excess of 10 
per cent. Taken together these numbers suggest that exports of goods and 
services could increase in volume terms by 7 per cent this year and by 7.4 per 
cent in 2012. 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1 : Exports of Goods and Services  
 
        
 2009 % Change in 2010 2010 % Change in 2011 2011 % Change in 2012 2012 
           
 €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn 
           
 Merchandise 78 5.6 6.8 83 6.0 6.0 87.9 6.9 8.0 95.0 
 Tourism 4 -10.2 -12.3 3 11.4 12.5 3.5 11.4 12.5 3.9 
 Other Services 64 8.1 11.2 71 7.9 8.0 76.4 7.8 8.0 82.5 
           
 Exports of Goods  
   and Services 
145 6.3 8.3 157 7.0 7.0 167.8 7.4 8.1 181.4 
           
 FISIM Adjustment 1   1   1.0   1.0 
           
 Adjusted Exports 146 6.3 8.1 158 7.0 7.0 168.8 7.4 8.1 182.4 
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3. Investment 
 
 
Total Investment fell by 24.9 per cent in volume terms in 2010.2 Building and 
construction declined by over 30 per cent while machinery and equipment and 
other elements of investment fell by 14.5 per cent. Within the building and 
construction sector, housing fell by 35.4 per cent in volume terms, civil 
engineering works (roads) by 27.1 per cent and the remainder by 25.7 per cent. 
Expenditure on transport equipment fell by 15.4 per cent, while expenditure on 
other machinery and equipment fell by 19.6 per cent. Overall, investment in 2010 
was 52 per cent below its peak level in 2007, and is now back at pre-1997 levels. 
 
The fundamental factors behind the decline in investment in recent years are still 
in place. Following the exuberance of the bubble era, there remains an excess 
supply of housing, office space and commercial space. The major road-building 
programme of the last decade is more or less complete, though there remain 
some serious bottlenecks that could usefully be cleared. First quarter figures 
show a further decline into 2011 in all the main categories of building and 
construction on a quarter to quarter and annual basis. Production in the civil 
engineering sector fell by 31.5 per cent in the first quarter and in the absence of 
new starts is likely to experience a 35-40 per cent fall this year, and by about 20 
per cent in 2012. Housing output fell again in the first quarter of the year and was 
running at just under 10 per cent of the peak level reached in 2006. There may be 
some slight recovery during the year as National Asset Management Agency 
(NAMA) is providing funds for the completion of some estates. NAMA has also 
attempted to kick-start the housing market by providing a floor on potential 
negative equity for purchasers of property it holds. This latter will reduce some 
element of the uncertainty that potential purchasers now face, but there are 
other considerable sources of uncertainty facing purchasers and society in 
general. There are also very many unsold second-hand houses, so that it is not 
certain that the NAMA approach will ease the market. There will continue to be 
some production of one-off housing and housing in some parts of the major 
cities, though prices will be considerably reduced. We expect a 18 per cent 
decline this year in the volume of housing output and a further 8 per cent decline 
in 2012. 
    
                                                            
2
  CSO, National Income and Expenditure 2010. 
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Other building output fell again in the first quarter of 2011, by 7.2 per cent 
compared with the final quarter of 2010. There still remains a surplus of office 
and commercial property, with many buildings empty. Existing shopping centres 
have empty units, as firms have closed since the onset of the downturn and retail 
sales in value and volume terms are 20-25 per cent below the previous peak. In 
this environment, significant investment is unlikely to be needed for some years. 
There may be some increased activity in small-scale projects, such as minor works 
in older schools to accommodate increased pupil numbers and some energy-
saving expenditure by households. 
 
Imports of producer capital goods rose by 22.2 per cent in the first four months 
compared with 2010. Registrations of new goods vehicles increased by 3 per cent 
in the first half of the year, though registrations of second-hand goods vehicles 
fell. The increase in imports of capital goods, along with the increase investment 
in machinery and equipment as seen in the latest QNA, are evidence of what we 
had expected: in manufacturing, expansion of existing facilities was underway, 
process development was continuing and new firms were beginning to invest.  
Announcements of planned investment by multinationals to date by the IDA 
indicate that there will be continued strong investment by overseas firms. 
Consequently, we expect machinery and equipment imports to rise again in 2012.  
 
We also expect investment in agriculture to strengthen this year and to increase 
more rapidly in 2012. Registrations of tractors, both new and second-hand, rose 
by 27.5 per cent and 17 per cent in the first half of the year. Farmers’ incomes fell 
by 40 per cent between 2007 and 2009 and this was followed by investment 
falling dramatically in 2009 and 2010. The recovery in incomes in 2010 and the 
continuation of this into this year and next, together with an expected increase in 
milk output due to improvements in competitiveness in the Irish dairy sector, 
when milk quotas are abolished in 2015, suggest that agricultural investment will 
recover.3 The precise CAP arrangements that will emerge in the future are still 
unclear but it is difficult to see why the natural advantage enjoyed in Ireland from 
grass-based production should be restricted, as it was when the quota system 
was introduced.  
 
Overall, investment is expected to fall by 6.7 per cent this year, and 2.8 per cent 
in 2012. 
 
                                                            
3
  Study of the International Competitiveness of the Irish Dairy Sector, Teagasc, June 2011. 
  
Table 2 : Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
 
        
 2009 % Change in 2010 2010 % Change in 2011 2011 % Change in 2012 2012 
           
 €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn 
           
 Housing 7.5 -35.6 -40.8 4.4 -18.4 -23.8 3.4 -8.1 -13.2 2.9 
           
 Other Building 8.6 -26.5 -32.4 5.8 -16.0 -18.5 4.7 -10.0 -10.0 4.2 
           
 Transfer Costs 0.6 -19.3 -31.5 0.4 -8.0 -4.5 0.4 -10.0 -2.0 0.4 
           
 Building and  Construction 16.7 -30.3 -36.1 10.7 -16.6 -20.1 8.5 -9.2 -10.9 7.6 
           
 Machinery and Equipment 8.6 -14.5 -13.8 7.4 9.0 10.1 8.1 5.0 6.1 8.6 
           
 Total 25.3 -24.9 -28.5 18.1 -6.7 -7.8 16.7 -2.8 -2.6 16.2 
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4. Household Consumption 
 
 
There have been some revisions to the National Accounts for earlier years and 
these revisions have changed our view about the extent to which the fall in 
domestic demand was exacerbated by a rise in the personal savings rate. The 
estimated savings rate for 2008 and 2009 are now 6.9 per cent and 10.5 per cent 
of disposable income, compared with previous Central Statistics Office (CSO) 
estimates of 5.2 per cent and 12.3 per cent.4  There was an increase in the savings 
rate in 2009 but this increase was significantly less than we had thought. There is 
no figure estimated on a comparable basis for 2010 though using data from 
Institutional Sector accounts which estimates the savings rate at 12.2 per cent it 
is possible to estimate the level of household savings at almost €11.5 billion in 
2010. Accumulated savings over the period 2006-2010 are now estimated at 
€31.5 billion compared with an earlier estimate of €37.8 billion. The build up of 
assets by the household sector was thus somewhat less than we had expected. 
   
A new quarterly series of Institutional Sector Accounts indicates that the savings 
rate in the first quarter of this year has increased again by as much as 1.6 
percentage points, though these data are provisional. First quarter National 
Accounts data indicate that household expenditure fell again, declining by the 
largest amount experienced for two years, with the savings rate, again measured 
by the Institutional Sector Accounts, increasing to 12.9 per cent of disposable 
income. We had expected that the personal savings rate would fall this year and 
that this would maintain household spending at the level reached in 2010, though 
the time path was expected to be uneven. Household spending in 2010 remained 
relatively constant throughout the year, at €21,183 million, €21,182 million, 
€21,188 million and €21,000 million for the four quarters, with the final quarter 
consumption adversely affected by the weather conditions at the time. We had 
expected some pick-up from those somewhat depressed levels in the first quarter 
of 2011 but this did not happen. The further decline in the first quarter put 
consumption 2.1 per cent below the level of the first quarter of 2010. This was 
especially disappointing given the extreme weather conditions experienced in the 
first part of 2010. The retail sales index, the main indicator of consumption, fell 
by 2 per cent quarter-on-quarter in the first quarter and while in the second 
quarter the retail sales index rose by 1.8 per cent it is difficult to see, even if retail 
sales continue to grow under the impact of increased tourist numbers – both 
people coming from abroad and an increasing number of Irish people holidaying 
                                                            
4
  Though this latter figure was estimated from institutional sector accounts rather than from the National Accounts. 
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at home – how household spending can remain relatively constant as we had 
previously forecast. 
 
As indicated above it now seems that the savings rate has remained high as 
households continue to build up savings levels. It remains the case that if 
household savings continue to increase it will be very difficult for domestic 
demand to increase as personal disposable income looks set to fall by 1.3 per 
cent this year, and unemployment and emigration are expected to continue.  
 
The first half of the year was characterised by a very high degree of uncertainty in 
relation to the public finances, and while the bailout and government’s liquid 
assets guaranteed funding for government to end-2013, there were fears 
expressed about the possibility of default. While the end-July agreement has 
eased these fears the uncertainty led to significant outflows from the banking 
system. Furthermore, the situation has not been helped by the added uncertainty 
in relation to the tax increases and expenditure reductions due in the next 
budget. Since the downturn, households have faced a very high degree of 
uncertainty in relation to employment, income, wealth and taxation. Protecting 
themselves against adverse outcomes is a significant motivator of household 
behaviour.  
 
In this environment the best that might be expected is that nominal expenditure 
by households would remain unchanged. The implicit consumption deflator may 
increase by about 1 per cent this year and by about the same in 2012. The fuel 
price increases, which earlier seemed temporary, have not been reversed and 
energy price increases for gas and electricity will push the deflator up this year, 
though these prices could easily fall back somewhat next year. Accordingly, we 
expect household consumption to fall by 1.3 per cent in volume terms this year 
and to remain relatively constant in 2012. The increase in prices is primarily due 
to the increase in energy prices and since this cannot be compensated for has 
resulted in a real loss to the economy, reflected in a fall in consumption. The 
Consumer Price Index is likely to increase by about 3 per cent this year, reflecting 
the same factors as well as the effect of mortgage interest rises. The energy 
prices may decrease in 2012, leading CPI inflation to slow to 1 per cent.
  
Table 3 : Personal Disposable Income  
 
        
 2009 % Change in 2010 2010 % Change in 2011 2011 % Change in 2012 2012 
           
 €bn % €bn €bn % €bn €bn % €bn €bn 
           
 Agriculture, etc. 2.2 24.9 0.5 2.7 9.8 0.3 3.0 10.0 0.3 3.3 
 Non-Agricultural Wages 73.6 -6.6 -4.9 68.8 -2.0 -1.4 67.4 1.6 1.1 68.5 
 Other Non-Agricultural Income 14.4 13.9 2.0 16.5 4.7 0.8 17.2 4.0 0.7 17.9 
           
 Total Income Received 90.3 -2.5 -2.3 88.0 -0.4 -0.3 87.6 2.3 2.1 89.7 
 Current Transfers 26.5 -0.4 -0.1 26.4 -1.9 -0.5 25.9 0.7 0.2 26.1 
           
 Gross Personal Income 116.8 -2.1 -2.4 114.4 -0.7 -0.8 113.6 2.0 2.2 115.8 
 Direct Personal Taxes 21.6 -3.4 -0.7 20.8 2.0 0.4 21.2 9.8 2.1 23.3 
           
 Personal Disposable Income  95.2 -1.7 -1.7 93.6 -1.3 -1.2 92.3 0.2 0.1 92.5 
 Consumption 85.2 -3.1 -2.6 82.6 -0.1 -0.1 82.5 1.0 0.8 83.4 
 Personal Savings 10.0   11.0   9.8   9.1 
 Savings Ratio 10.5   11.7   10.6   9.8 
 Average Personal Tax Rate 18.5   18.2   18.7   20.1 
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5. Public Finances 
 
 
Table 4(a) and 4(b) set out the budget figures for 2011, amended slightly by later 
figures with the end year returns, the figures taken from the Revised Estimates of 
Public Expenditure and Ireland – Stability Programme Update, April 2011 
(Department of Finance), our forecast of the likely outturn for the year are based 
on trends during the year to date, and our forecast for 2012.  
 
Table 4(a): Exchequer Finances € billion 
 
 2010 
Outcome 
2011 
Budget 
(Amended) 
2011      
Forecast 
2012 
Forecast 
     
Net current expenditure  47.0 48.5 48.4 47.7 
 Net voted expenditure 40.5 41.8 41.3 39.6 
 Non-voted expenditure  6.5 6.7 7.1 8.1 
Current revenue 34.4 36.9 37.2 39.0 
 Tax revenue 31.8 34.9 35.0 37.8 
 Non-tax revenue 2.7 2.0 2.2 1.2 
Current budget deficit (1) 12.6 11.5 11.2 8.7 
Capital expenditure 8.0 8.2 8.1 7.4 
 Net voted expenditure 5.9 4.3 4.2 3.5 
 Non-voted* 2.1 4.0 3.9 3.9 
Capital receipts 1.8 2.1 2.0 1.6 
Capital deficit (2) 6.2 6.1 6.1 5.8 
     
Exchequer deficit (1+2) 18.7 17.7 17.3 14.5 
     
General Government Balance 
(deficit) 
49.9 15.2 22.4 11.4 
Source:  Budget 2011, Ireland – Stability Programme Update, April 2011 (Department of Finance), July Exchequer Returns. Rounding may 
affect figures. * Excludes recapitalisation figures which are included in the General Government Balance, but includes promissory 
notes. 
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Table 4(b): Exchequer Finances National Accounts Classification € billion 
 
 2010 2011 2012 
    
RECEIPTS €bn €bn €bn 
Current receipts:    
Taxes on income and wealth (including social insurance contributions) 25 26 28 
Taxes on expenditure (including rates) 18 18 19 
Other receipts 4 6 6 
Total 47 50 54 
EXPENDITURE    
Net current expenditure on goods and services 26 25 24 
Current transfer payments 29 28 28 
National debt interest payments 5 6 7 
Gross fixed capital formation 6 6 4 
Other expenditure 33 7 2 
Total 99 72 64 
GENERAL GOVERNMENT BALANCE -52 -22 -11 
 
 
The presentation of the accounts is not ideal because of the treatment of the 
recapitalisation of the banks and the treatment of the promissory notes to Anglo-
Irish Bank. The exchequer deficit forecast figure excludes the recent 
recapitalisation of AIB, Bank of Ireland and Irish Life and Permanent, the 
exchequer contribution to this at end-July is €7.6 billion and that of the National 
Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF) is €10 billion, though this is not included in the 
exchequer returns. Ideally, we require consolidated accounts at least when such 
large transactions are taking place) but includes the promissory notes payment to 
Anglo-Irish Bank, Irish Nationwide Building Society and the Educational Building 
Society, while the General Government Balance (GGB) includes the former and 
excludes the latter, as the full cost of this was included in the GGB in 2010, and is 
included in measures of National Debt at end-2010. The trend in the underlying 
budget position is probably best captured by the current budget deficit, as the 
capital budget is so distorted by accounting conventions.  
 
The exchequer returns for the first seven months provide a reasonable indication 
of how the budgetary situation is developing. Voted current expenditure is 
running 1.4 per cent below the expected total for the period and 3.5 per cent 
above the level of the first seven months of 2010. This overstates the true picture 
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as the health levy was previously subtracted from Health expenditure. Now it is 
not, but is treated as a revenue item, included in the Universal Social Charge 
(USC) which in turn is included in Income Tax receipts. In the first seven months 
of the year this is estimated to have raised €1.1-1.2 billion in revenue. When 
allowance is made for this, then, on a comparable basis, current expenditure is 
down about 1.5 per cent. We expect that this trend will continue and current 
expenditure will come in below budget. 
 
Tax revenue in the first seven months of the year was 8.6 per cent higher than a 
year earlier, and 1.4 per cent above the estimated profile for the period. 
However, when allowance is made for the USC, the situation is less favourable, 
with overall tax revenue increasing by about 3 per cent. Nevertheless, the year 
totals look achievable. Thus, we expect the current budget deficit at year end to 
be slightly lower than budgeted. On the capital side there may be some further 
savings, but it is difficult to forecast what these might be at this stage.  
 
Turning to 2012, the broad fiscal framework is laid out in the report on the 
EU/IMF Programme of Support for Ireland issued by the Department of Finance 
(28 July, 2011). This set down explicit guidelines in relation to revenue and 
expenditure for Budget 2012. In practice, government has more leeway in 
relation to changes in taxation and expenditure than implied by this as if the 
required deficit reduction can be met in other ways this will satisfy the conditions 
of the loans. Nevertheless, the agreement sets out a profile of how of how these 
savings can be achieved. 
 
Revenue Measures to yield €1,500 million in a full year, but including: a lowering 
of income tax bands and credits; a reduction in private pension tax reliefs; a 
reduction in general tax expenditures; a property tax; a reform of capital gains tax 
and acquisitions tax; and, an increase in the carbon tax. 
 
Expenditure reductions of €2,100 million including: social expenditure reductions; 
reductions in public service numbers and public service pension adjustments; 
(reductions in) other programme expenditure; and, reductions in capital 
expenditure. 
 
While the broad amounts are explicit, no detail has yet been provided. It is the 
detail that determines the reaction of the private sector to the changes and it is 
this reaction that will influence the extent to which there are negative or positive 
effects on the economy, quite independently of the obvious macro effects of 
 23 
reducing demand in the economy by these amounts. There are also explicit big-
picture numbers proposed for 2013, with revenue measures yielding €1.1 billion, 
and expenditure reductions of €2 billion. Government has indicated that it will go 
beyond these broad numbers and state exactly what the tax changes and 
expenditure reductions will be and this is welcome as the private sector than 
then plan accordingly. In framing the medium term fiscal details government 
should aim to surpass the targets set down in the Programme of Support for the 
reasons stated previously. In addition, there may be other adverse conditions not 
yet anticipated and there may be a need for some flexibility – a flexibility that 
would not be there if the budget targets are too tight. The 2012 figures could also 
be affected by timing conditions in relation to interest payments on EU/IMF and 
other loans. Nevertheless, the proposed cuts in expenditure and tax increases 
should proceed as planned and any savings on interest used to reduce the deficit 
faster. 
 
In framing the budgets it is as well to recognise that output is significantly less 
than at the peak of the bubble, so that the infrastructural requirements are less 
than envisaged some years ago. Hence, proposed capital expenditure should 
reflect this, as well as the shortage for funds. 
 
BOX 1: INFRASTRUCTURE BY EDGAR MORGENROTH 
Public capital investment tends to be the first casualty when governments 
embark on deficit reduction, and it often impacts negatively on the growth 
potential of the economy. However, given the specific set of circumstances in 
Ireland today, reduced infrastructure investment over the next few years need 
not have this negative effect and can help to achieve a more sustainable 
budgetary position. 
 
An extensive literature has shown that infrastructure yields a high long-run 
macroeconomic return. The return on such investment depends on the size and 
quality of the existing infrastructure stock and the level of demand for it. Thus, if 
the current infrastructure stock is adequate and no constraints exist then the 
likely return on further investment at this point is low or even negative. 
 
While there are some additional short-run benefits to infrastructure investment 
via the stimulus associated with the construction phase, the long-run impacts 
tend to be a multiple of the short-run impact. Consequently, infrastructure 
investment should be undertaken primarily with the long-run impact in mind. The 
actual short-run impact depends on the type of project and the import content. 
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Specifically large scale projects involving the construction of new infrastructure 
have a smaller jobs impact per Euro spent than smaller scale projects and in 
particular refurbishment and maintenance projects.5 
 
Capital expenditure over the period 2000 to 2009 reveals that investment in 
infrastructure amounted to almost €55 billion in 2009 prices. Despite this 
significant level of investment some competitiveness reports rank Ireland poorly 
in terms of overall infrastructure. However, once objective measures are used in 
a comparison and relevant factors are taken into account the relative position of 
Ireland with regard to many infrastructures is considerably better than suggested 
by the subjective competitiveness rankings.  
 
While infrastructure was increasingly under severe pressure up to 2007, the 
economic downturn (reflected in the significant decline in GNP) has significantly 
reduced the pressure on infrastructure. In relation to transport, for example, 
passenger journeys on CIE services are down by 18 per cent compared to the 
peak in 2007. Passenger numbers at Dublin airport declined by 21 per cent 
between 2008 and 2010, while at the same time capacity for some 15 million 
passengers has been added through the completion of Terminal 2.    
 
The process of drawing up of a National Development Plan (NDP) that can 
account for the complementarities between investments and ensure consistency 
with the national objectives is the first-best approach to capital investment 
programming. However, this approach requires some certainty on capital budgets 
over a multi-annual period. Capital budgets have been cut successively and now 
amount to just 50 per cent of what had been planned in 2007 even if one takes 
into account that tender prices have fallen by about 25 per cent.  At this point 
there this no certainty that further cuts might not have to be implemented. 
Furthermore, the results of Census 2011 should be taken into account in 
determining the scale, nature and location of investment. To date only the 
preliminary results of the CSO Census 2011 have been published, which showed a 
surprisingly higher population than had previously been estimated. Thus, the 
detailed plans that would make up a new NDP could be subject to change, or if 
the capital budget were to be cut further result in postponements of projects, 
which would undermine confidence in the NDP process. In addition to the 
uncertainty about the funding envelope and the demographics there is also 
considerable uncertainty about the right projects to pursue. The proper 
transparent evaluation and analysis has in many cases not been carried out or, 
                                                            
5
  However, it has been shown that the cost per job created (maintained) through publicly funded construction projects is high when 
compared to other public job creation subsidies like IDA grants. See Morgenroth, E. (2009). “Irish Public Capital Spending in a 
Recession”, ESRI Working Paper No. 298. 
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where such analysis was done, this did not reflect the changed environment. 
Therefore it would seem imprudent to embark on a full scale National 
Development Plan for a five to seven year period and instead a more modest 
interim public capital plan should be drawn up.  
 
In the context of the significant expansion of the infrastructure stock and the 
reduced demand in the short term the current focus of capital spending should 
be on maintaining the existing infrastructure.  The only exception should be for 
infrastructure in very specific locations where constraints can be demonstrated. 
Where any substantial investment is being considered it should be supported by a 
comprehensive evaluation, including a proper cost-benefit analysis. For example, 
before water meters are rolled out, a cost-benefit analysis should be undertaken 
to estimate whether the net benefit of water meters justifies their roll out for the 
whole country or whether they are justified in some areas only because of 
installation and monitoring costs. Measures that improve the efficient use of 
existing infrastructure should also be prioritised as these will reduce the need for 
further capacity expansion at a reasonable cost. For example, the reduction of 
water leakage from the mains combined with other demand management 
measures in Dublin can potentially defer or even eliminate the need to make to 
build the required infrastructure to supply Dublin with water from the Shannon.` 
 
To improve the quality of decision making on major infrastructure 
projects/programmes, the evaluation of projects should be based on 
independent analysis outside of the promoting agency and these evaluations 
should be published in order to allow public scrutiny. 
 
The revised Estimates for Public Services for 2011 indicate a reduction of 1.1 per 
cent in whole-time equivalent numbers employed. When taken in conjunction 
with reductions in other expenditure, this suggests a 3.3 per cent decline in net 
government expenditure on goods and services in volume terms. We expect the 
decline to be greater in 2012, as the full-year effects of the Croke Park Agreement 
are felt along with the additional expenditure cuts outlined above. 
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6. Population, Employment, 
Unemployment and Earnings  
 
 
The preliminary results of the Census of Population 2011 were somewhat 
surprising in that they revealed a population significantly greater than the 
population and migration estimates available since the 2006 Census would have 
indicated.  
 
The 2011 population is approximately 100,000 more than expected on the basis 
of official CSO estimates.  The greater part of this difference is likely to be in the 
15-64 age group, of whom over 60,000 could be in the labour force, accounting 
for 3 per cent of the total. Unfortunately, since we have no way of determining 
the age distribution of this group until early 2012, we cannot be certain of the 
totals of those in work or unemployed, though the data for rates of, for instance 
unemployment by age group, or participation by age group, are probably correct. 
Often reweighting makes little difference to grossed up numbers, but it would be 
unwise to assume that the additional population is evenly distributed by age 
group. There may also be gender issues as the annual net migration estimates for 
2006-2010 indicate net migration of 51.7 thousand males and 53.3 thousand 
females, while the preliminary 2011 Census estimates these for the whole period 
at 33.6 thousand and 88.1 thousand, respectively. These data may also have 
implications for grossing up income estimates and hence estimates of GNP and 
GDP and also growth rates. Unfortunately, as things now stand, we must wait 
until next year before the Census results are available so that the QNHS results 
can be re-weighted. 
 
BOX 2: CENSUS 2011 AND MIGRATION ESTIMATES 
The preliminary estimate of the 2011 population is 4,581,269 compared with a 
figure of 4,239,848 from the 2006 Census, and the net migration (inflow) figure 
for the period 2006-2011 was 118,650. The intercensal net migration figure is 
estimated as a residual. The 2006 population is known from the 2006 Census, and 
the 2011 population is known from the 2011 Census. The population changes as a 
result of births and deaths, both of which are known from mandatory registration 
and migration, which is unknown, but derived from the others. Simply put: 
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 Population 2011 = Population 2006 + (Births-Death) + Net Migration  
or Net Migration = Population 2011 - Population 2006 – (Births - Deaths) 
 
In making annual intercensal estimates of population, as for 2009 for instance, it 
is necessary to make an estimate of net migration in that year – this is no longer 
derived from known population numbers. This migration estimate is then added 
to an estimate of the population based on projecting forward the existing 2008 
population by ageing the numbers by one year, adding the number of births and 
subtracting the number of deaths. The annual migration flows are estimated from 
the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS), supplemented by data such as 
the number of Personal Public Service numbers issued to non-Irish nationals, the 
number of work permits issued or renewed and the number of asylum 
applications. This allows an estimate of emigration and immigration and the 
QNHS detail makes it feasible to distinguish gender, age, region, etc. 
 
The methodology is basically sound and is preferable to the previous reliance on 
net passenger movements by sea and air, which historically formed the backbone 
of annual estimates of migration. If the estimated net migration figure for the 
period April 2006 to April 2010 of 63,000 was correct, the census results would 
imply that there was a net inflow of over 55,000 people in the year to April 2011.  
This number seems highly implausible when the general expectation was that 
there had been a net outflow in that year. The CSO has suggested that inward 
migration was stronger in the early part of the intercensal period and that this 
was followed by a switch to net outward migration towards the end of the 
period. This suggests that the annual population and migration estimates need to 
be revised back to 2006.  
 
In general, Census results are taken as absolutes, but there may be some benefit 
in revisiting the 2006 Census results with the additional information available 
from the 2011 Census and other administrative data, and examining the 
emigration estimates that are derived from the QNHS. It is important to have 
reasonably accurate population data as the QNHS itself is weighted to reflect 
population estimates by age, sex, and region. Furthermore the initial selection of 
households for the QNHS is based on population density. These revisions are 
potentially very important to estimates of the labour force, employment and 
unemployment as well as many of the characteristics of the labour force. 
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In spite of these caveats in relation to the QNHS there is still a big picture that 
emerges from the data. First, there has been a catastrophic fall in the numbers 
employed in construction. Employment in the sector peaked in the second 
quarter of 2007 at 271,600 and has fallen continuously since then reaching 
108,100 in the first quarter of this year. The collapse in construction output has 
created a structural unemployment problem. The full scale of this is difficult to 
gauge as a significant number of workers in this sector were from overseas, and a 
certain number of these will have returned home (the number being somewhat 
uncertain, as discussed above). In addition, some of those previously employed in 
the sector will have obtained work in other sectors, including agriculture. The 
following table attempts to capture the scale of the problem. 
 
Table 5: Employment and Unemployment 000s Irish and Non-Irish 
 
 Quarter Irish Non-Irish Total 
     
Total Population >14 Q II 2007  
QI I 2011 
 3,027.5       
 3,150.3   
435.0 
357.3 
3,462.5 
3,507.6 
     
Labour Force Q II 2007 
QI I 2011  
1,882.0 
1,852.2 
335.0 
247.7 
 
     
Total Employment Q II 2007 
QI I 2011  
1,798.4 
1,601.4 
315.5 
202.9 
2,113.9 
1,8043 
     
Employment in 
Construction 
Q II 2007 
QI I 2011  
224.7 
98.5 
45.2 
8.9 
269.9 
107.4 
     
Unemployment Q II 2007 
QI I 2011 
83.6 
250.8 
19.5 
44.8 
103.1 
295.6 
     
Total Numbers (Irish and 
Non-Irish) unemployed  
who previously worked 
in construction 
QI 2007 
QI 2011 
  16.7 
79.5 
Source. QNHS Various issues.  
 
The total numbers still unemployed out of the construction sector was 79,500 in 
the first quarter of this year, though total employment in the sector had fallen by 
162,500 from the peak level of employment in the first quarter of 2007. Some of 
those who lost their jobs may have retired, may have gone to other employment 
and many others may have migrated. The non-Irish population aged over 14 fell 
by 77,700, with the non-Irish labour force declining by 87,300 and a very small 
change in the numbers of non-Irish not economically active over the same period. 
This suggests that a significant number of those who lost their jobs emigrated. 
We cannot be certain, but a reasonable inference is that many of those who 
emigrated must also have been in the construction sector. This still leaves a very 
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large number of people who were previously in the construction sector being 
currently unemployed. This is the basis for believing that there is a major 
structural unemployment problem. Had all construction workers obtained 
employment, even with the same high level of unemployment, then the problem 
would not be structural. There is still high unemployment among construction 
workers.  Meanwhile, there are reports of skill shortages in some sectors, but the 
numbers are relatively small. 
 
Unemployment has regional and gender aspects in addition to structural. Male 
participation rates have fallen from 73.9 per cent in early 2007 to 68.2 per cent in 
the first quarter of this year. The rate of male unemployment has increased from 
4.7 per cent to 17.2 per cent over the same period. By contrast female 
participation fell from 54.7 per cent to 52.9 per cent, while female 
unemployment rose from 3.9 per cent to 10.4 per cent. There is, however, a 
much greater incidence of part-time working among women and this has 
increased slightly over the period. There is also a regional dimension to 
unemployment. In the first quarter the average unemployment rate was 14.1 per 
cent, but the Border, Dublin Mid-East and South-West experienced 
unemployment rates below that while the Midland, West, Mid-West and South-
East were above it. Dublin had the lowest rate at 12.5 per cent whereas the 
South-East had the highest at 17.2 per cent. There has been a significant increase 
in participation rates in education among younger age groups, thus reducing their 
participation in the labour force. 
 
 Current trends in employment and unemployment so far this year are not 
encouraging. The first quarter employment and unemployment figures were, on 
the face of it, better, showing a reduction in the rate of decline in employment 
and a reduction in the rate of unemployment compared with the final quarter of 
2010. However, the final quarter now looks like an outlier and perhaps there are 
changes in seasonal patterns that are not being picked up yet. The Standardised 
Unemployment rate estimated from the Live Register rose during the second 
quarter and into July. The average rate of unemployment in 2010, including the 
very high fourth quarter figure, was 13.6 per cent, and this year it may average 
14.3. As things now stand, unemployment will rise again in 2012. The scale of this 
increase depends on the extent to which migration will reduce the numbers 
unemployed. The rise in unemployment, and the likelihood that it will persist, 
even though there are significant flows on to and off the Live Register, means 
that the number of long-term unemployed will increase. This highlights the need 
for policy directed to maintain the link that those unemployed have with the 
labour market (see Box 3 below). 
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The recent data in relation to migration over the period 2006-2011 show how 
hard it is to estimate, never mind forecast, migration. We understand the factors 
that affect the migration in the past, covering the 1950s the 1970s and the 1980s 
when much of the migration was between Ireland and the UK. However, we do 
not have sufficient data to explain migration between Ireland and the new 
accession states and the migration of people from those states when they 
emigrate from here. 
 
In terms of other sectors, employment in agriculture could increase this year and 
next given the increases in agricultural output and incomes that seems likely, and 
the absence of alternatives. There could be some increase in employment in 
manufacturing in the second half of the year as a result of increases in exports, 
though these may be slight as domestic demand remains very weak. Construction 
output and employment will fall again this year and next. In the services sector 
public sector employment will fall. There has already been a reduction in 
numbers employed, as reported under the Croke Park Agreement, and the ban 
on recruitment is having an effect on numbers as people retire. The constraints 
on the budget in the health services and the necessity to cut back on recruitment 
even where posts were approved, suggest that employment will fall. There may 
be some shifting to private sector activity if the public health service constraint 
becomes more serious, though there have been declines in the total numbers 
covered by private health insurance. Nevertheless, there may be greater 
utilisation of private sector entitlements as public sector services are constrained. 
The one area where there could be increases in employment during the year is in 
the hospitality sector. The increase in the number of overseas visitors and in the 
number of Irish people opting to take domestic holidays have had some impact 
on the sector, but it remains depressed. In the first quarter of this year there was 
a 10 per cent fall in employment in the sector and even with a modest recovery 
during this year it is difficult to see the annual level rising. Next year could be 
better if the momentum gained this year can be maintained in the face of what is 
likely to be a very difficult international environment. The latest data show 
modest increases in employment in some professional and technical areas and 
while this is likely to be maintained the gains are unlikely to outweigh the losses 
elsewhere in 2011. Thus service sector employment is expected to fall this year 
but perhaps will rise slightly next year. 
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Table 6: Employment and Unemployment  
 
 Annual Averages 000s 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
  
 Agriculture 96 85 88 90 
 Industry 411 240 235 245 
Construction  120 100 90 
 Services 1,422 1,403 1,380 1,390 
 Total at Work 1,929 1,848 1,803 1,815 
 Unemployed 259 292 300 310 
  
 Labour Force 2,187 2,140 2,103 2,125 
 Unemployment Rate % 11.8 13.6 14.3 14.5     
 
  
BOX 3: ACTIVATION IN IRELAND: THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT ACTION PLAN 
S. McGuinness, P.J. O’Connell and E. Kelly  
 
Ireland’s unemployment rate currently stands at 14.3 per cent. Given the scale of 
the problems facing the country at present, the level of unemployment is likely to 
remain high over the medium term. In this context, it is particularly important to 
implement effective activation measures to assist and encourage jobseekers to 
remain active in the labour market and/or to increase their employability in order 
to avoid long-term unemployment.  
 
In 2009, the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) was commissioned by 
the Department of Social Protection (DSP) to conduct a systematic evaluation of 
activation measures that are implemented under the National Employment 
Action Plan (NEAP), which is Ireland’s activation strategy.6 Under the NEAP, 
unemployed individuals in receipt of Jobseeker’s Benefit (JB) or Jobseeker’s 
Allowance (JA) who reach three months on the Live Register are identified by the 
DSP and referred to FÁS for an activation interview. In this interview, the client’s 
needs are assessed and he/she is provided with job search assistance. Some 
individuals are also referred to employment or training opportunities. The ESRI 
study evaluated two key interventions implemented under the NEAP: i) referral 
by the DSP for an activation interview with FÁS and ii) participation in training 
programmes provided by FÁS following an activation interview. The analysis was 
based on a unique dataset that was constructed by combining three separate 
                                                            
6  See McGuinness, S., O’Connell, P.J., Kelly, E., and Walsh, J. (2011). Activation in Ireland: An Evaluation of the National 
Employment Action Plan. ESRI Research Series 20. Dublin: ESRI.  
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data sources: i) a specially designed questionnaire administered to all new 
claimants for JB or JA between September and December 2006; ii) weekly 
administrative data from the Live Register of unemployment, which contained 
information on all unemployment benefit recipients in Ireland, and on their 
movements on and off the Live Register; and iii) client event files collected by 
FÁS. Those jobseekers that registered a new unemployment benefit claim 
between September and December 2006 were subsequently tracked until July 
2008, so the evaluation refers to the effects of the NEAP over that time period.  
 
The research pointed to three main findings on the effectiveness of Ireland’s 
activation strategy: 
1. There were problems of access to programmes under the NEAP, so not all of 
those jobseekers who needed to participate in an activation measure did so. 
Approximately 25 per cent of jobseekers who were eligible for assistance 
under the NEAP were not in fact identified and referred. Another 25 per cent 
of jobseekers who had a previous spell of unemployment and received an 
intervention at that time were not eligible for NEAP assistance in their 
current spell.  
2. Those individuals who were referred by the DSP to FÁS for an activation 
interview were less likely to become employed. When the authors compared 
the employment outcomes of those that were either referred for an 
interview with FÁS or had received both a referral and an activation 
interview with a group of similarly unemployed individuals that were not 
referred, it was found that this NEAP intervention had a negative impact, 
with the chances of entering employment being about 17 per cent lower for 
those who went through the referral and interview process.  
3. FÁS training programmes increased participant’s employment prospects. 
Compared with jobseekers that were either referred for an interview with 
FÁS or had received both a referral and an activation interview, FÁS training 
was found to increase an unemployed person’s likelihood of exiting the Live 
Register by between 10 and 14 per cent. However, the combined effect of 
receiving both FÁS training and an activation interview was either zero, or at 
best, weakly positive, because of the negative impact of the FÁS referral and 
interview process.  
 
The DSP is currently developing a new National Employment and Entitlements 
Service (NEES) which has the potential to deliver a number of important reforms:  
1. The NEES is to take a greater role in providing activation services for the 
unemployed, as well as for the more traditional role in paying benefits 
performed heretofore by the DSP. This combination of income support and 
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activation policies is similar to the role adopted by social welfare authorities 
in other countries.  
2. The DSP is introducing a profiling system for the unemployed, developed in 
collaboration between the Department and ESRI researchers. Profiling is a 
state-of-the-art statistically-based system for the early identification of those 
with a high probability of becoming long-term unemployed at the time they 
first become unemployed. This will facilitate the delivery of appropriate 
interventions with jobseekers according to their likelihood of becoming long-
term unemployed, and provides the capacity to target resources on those 
who most need, and can benefit most from, activation measures.  
3. The DSP is implementing a new case management system with a strong 
focus on activation, rather than just income support. A further innovation is 
the provision for sanctions to be applied to unemployed persons on the Live 
Register unreasonably refusing to participate in training, education and 
employment offered by the NEES.  
 
These developments are welcome. Underlying the reforms is a new commitment 
to a social contract based on mutual obligations: job seekers are expected to seek 
work and improve their employability and in return receive income support and 
high quality activation services from the community. To underpin that social 
contract, activation policy needs to have systematic monitoring of job search 
activity backed up by effective sanctions, while training policy needs to focus on 
programmes with a close connection to the labour market that enhance the 
employment prospects of their participants.  
 
Average earnings in the economy at large remained relatively constant 
throughout 2010 following the declines of the previous year, though the wage bill 
was down 3.3 per cent. Recent years have been characterised by falling public 
and private sector wages. Public sector pay rates were reduced from January 
2010, with pay cuts averaging 6.2 per cent, though with increments the actual 
cuts were less (Chart 1). The pension levy introduced for public servants, from the 
first half of 2009 represented an average deduction of approximately 7 per cent.7  
Private sector earnings fell slightly earlier and the declines are less. However, 
private sector data are more difficult to interpret as there has been a much 
greater fall in private sector employment by sector and consequently some 
composition changes, where patterns of average earnings differ by sector. For 
instance, while average hourly earnings (excluding irregular earnings) fell by 0.2 
per cent between the first quarters of 2010 and 2011 average hourly earnings in 
                                                            
7
  The earnings data from the CSO do not allow for the pension levy, which is treated as a deduction, rather than a cut in 
income. 
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Construction declined by 8.1 per cent and earnings in the Information and 
Communication sector rose by 5.2 per cent. There may also be within-firm 
composition changes with employment losses among unskilled workers greater 
than among skilled workers and this can affect measured average earnings. The 
decline in hourly earnings in Construction is exactly what might be expected, 
given the decline in employment in the sector, but the increase in unemployment 
might have been expected to have a bigger impact on earnings than it has. This 
same characteristic was observed during the long-1980s recession, with insiders 
effectively protecting themselves, and was only broken in the early years of social 
consensus when pay increases were less than might have been expected.8 This 
was easier to achieve in the 1980’s with inflation running at 4 per cent compared 
with the present situation where further real and nominal wage cuts will be 
required. This point is returned to in the General Assessment, but we do not see 
nominal average hourly earnings increasing, except in some isolated areas, such 
as International Services where shortages have emerged, and possibly in export-
oriented indigenous firms.  
 
Figure 1: Public Sector Hourly Earnings, Annual % Change  
 
 
Source: Earnings and Labour Costs, CSO. 
 
 
                                                            
8
  Durkan, J. and Harmon, C. (1996). “Social Consensus, Income Policies and Unemployment”, UCD Centre for Economic 
Research WP 96/11, UCD. 
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Figure 2: Private Sector Hourly Earnings, Annual % Change  
 
Source: Earnings and Labour Costs, CSO. 
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7. Imports and the Balance of 
Payments 
 
 
The latest National Accounts9 revised very heavily the previous annual and 
quarterly estimates of imports of goods and services in both value and volume 
terms for 2010 and 2009, leading to significant adjustments in the percentage 
changes. For 2010 the figures are now 5.7 and 2.7 per cent respectively, 
compared with the previous estimates of 7.4 and 6.6 per cent.  
 
In the first five months of the year imports were 11.4 per cent higher than a year 
earlier. This was partly driven by imports of machinery, referred to earlier and 
reflecting investment by firms, but there was also an increase in imports of goods 
for further production. Ideally, we would like to relate these imports directly to 
output, but the data are complicated in that the Quarterly National Accounts 
show a small decrease in stock levels in the first quarter while the stock figures 
for industry show an increase following a period of reduction. We suspect that 
stock levels in the export sector have increased, but with the contraction in 
construction work in progress has collapsed, and stocks at retail level are being 
run down, reflecting the relatively poor growth in the sector. Energy prices have 
risen during the year, so that the increase associated with the Libyan conflict has 
persisted – though there have been some decreases recently. The short-term 
outlook for energy prices is very uncertain. Demand in developing Asia continues 
to increase, while in developed economies the weakness in GDP growth has led 
to volume reductions. The effect of the price increases has led to increased 
expenditure as demand is still relatively price inelastic in the short run. 
 
The increase in imports has been widespread across all SITC sections and 
divisions. In addition to increases in energy imports, and in cars, there were rises 
in chemical and pharmaceutical imports. Import prices have also risen, driven 
partly by oil and gas price rises. These are now feeding into the domestic price 
level with a lag and there will be a similar lag if the price reductions are sustained.  
 
                                                            
9
  National Income and Expenditure 2010, CSO, August 2011. 
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Data for the earlier part of the year indicate that overseas tourism expenditure 
has fallen, and passenger movements suggest that this has continued into the 
third quarter. The indications are that such expenditure may decline by 10 per 
cent in volume terms this year and by the same amount again in 2012. 
 
We expect the growth in imports of goods to slacken in the second half of the 
year. Nevertheless, imports will rise by about 5 per cent in volume terms this 
year, with import prices increasing by about 1.3 per cent. The rise in import prices 
is in contrast to the stagnant export prices. The resulting deterioration in the 
terms of trade is another adverse factor affecting the economy.  
 
Imports in 2012 may grow slightly faster as stock levels are built up again in 
manufacturing, given the forecast increase in modern sector exports and the level 
of investment in machinery and equipment. 
 
Table 7: Balance of Payments 2010-2012, € billion  
 
 2010 2011 2012 
    
Exports of goods and services 157.7 168.8 182.4 
Imports of goods and services 127.9 135.9 145.5 
Net Factor Payments -27.8 -30.4 -33.4 
Net Transfer -1.2 -1.0 -1.0 
Balance on current account 0.8 1.5 2.5 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 8: Imports of Goods and Services   
 
 2009 % Change in 2010 2010 % Change in 2011 2011 % Change in 2012 2012 
           
 €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn 
           
 Merchandise 45.2 -1.8 2.8 46.4 -0.9 5.1 48.8 5.4 6.5 52 
 Tourism 6.3 -6.9 -7.3 5.8 -10.0 -10.0 5.2 -10.0 -9.5 5 
 Other Services 68.9 6.5 9.0 75.1 9.5 8.2 81.3 7.0 8.5 88 
           
 Imports of Goods  
   and Services 
120.4 2.7 5.8 127.4 4.9 6.2 135.3 5.8 7.1 145 
           
 FISIM Adjustment 0.7   0.5   0.6   1 
           
 Adjusted Imports 121.0 2.7 5.7 127.9 4.9 6.2 135.9 5.8 7.1 145 
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8. Overall Output 
 
 
Although there have been some  changes in our perception of what is happening 
in the economy over the past few months, the overall picture still shows positive 
GNP and GDP growth for this year and next, with next year’s growth gathering 
pace. We now expect household consumption to fall in volume terms this year 
because of the increase in prices now in the system and as a consequence, when 
consumption turns, to grow only very modestly during next year. Investment in 
machinery and equipment will grow faster this year than we had expected. Total 
domestic demand will fall by 1.8 per cent this year, but this will improve in 2012, 
but will still experience a decline of 0.5 per cent. GNP may grow by 0.2 per cent 
this year and 0.7 per cent in 2012. The corresponding figures for GDP are 1.8 and 
2.3 per cent respectively.   
 
In the recent past the economy has experienced a significant worsening in the 
terms of trade.  Conventional measures of output, such as GDP and GNP make no 
allowance for this. A worsening of the terms of trade means that more output is 
required to maintain a given level of imports. When GNP is adjusted for the terms 
of trade then GNP fell in 2010 and is forecast to fall again this year, but more or 
less stabilising in 2012. 
 
 
Table 9: Measures of Output, % Volume Change 
 
 2010 2011 2012 
    
GDP -0.4 1.8 2.3 
GNP 0.3 0.2 0.7 
GNP adjusted for Terms of Trade -1.1 -1.4 -0.1 
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9. Banking Crisis and the Real 
Economy 
 
 
BANK FUNDING AND DOMESTIC CREDIT 
The size of the domestic banking sector balance sheet has fallen by €200 billion, 
or nearly one-quarter, from its peak in mid-2009. Wholesale funding for domestic 
banks has diminished due to the perceived inadequacy of banks’ capital reserves, 
declining credit ratings and greater uncertainty in the interbank lending market 
across the eurozone. The funding base has also been steadily eroded by the 
outflow of deposits, particularly those of non-residents. Non-resident deposits 
fell by over a half in the year to June. Indeed, the foreign liabilities of the 
domestic banking sector have decreased far faster than other liabilities, meaning 
that as a share of total liabilities they have fallen from a high of around 50 per 
cent in 2008, to around 20 per cent in 2011. This outflow is expected to persist 
due to downgrading of Ireland’s sovereign debt to junk status by Moody’s ratings 
agency.  
 
Lost funding has been replaced to an extent by borrowing from the Eurosystem. 
This borrowing grew rapidly last year, and peaked at €97 billion in November. It 
has since fallen to €72 billion, but this is partially due to a temporary increase in 
government deposits of some €18 billion that is expected to be used to 
recapitalise the banking system. It is hoped that this recapitalisation will instil 
confidence in the ability of banks to withstand future expected losses. There is 
some evidence that this approach is paying off, mainly the recent investment of 
€1.7 billion of private funding in Bank of Ireland. However, this is dwarfed by the 
€65 billion contribution committed by the State since the onset of the banking 
crisis. 
 
On the asset side of the balance sheet, the issuance of credit has significantly 
contracted due to both supply and demand forces. On the margin, the demand 
for credit increases during downturns, but this has been outweighed by the 
deleveraging being pursued on aggregate by both households and businesses. 
The supply of credit has also decreased, at least partially due to the need set out 
in the troika deal for the banks to ‘rightsize’. This policy seeks to decrease the 
contingent liability the State assumed via the guarantee of covered institutions’ 
liabilities, as well as the exposure of the Eurosystem.  
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There is also evidence of credit rationing by banks due to the increased likelihood 
of default and repayment difficulties by borrowers that generally accompany 
recessions. CSO data on firms’ access to credit shows that the proportion of firms 
whose applications for loans were successful fell sharply from 93.6 per cent in 
2007 to 68.1 per cent in 2010, though 2007 represented the peak of the boom 
and the banks’ appetite for risk. This pattern was consistent even for high growth 
businesses and businesses in well-performing sectors such as information and 
communication technologies. For households, the interest rates being charged 
for personal loans by banks remain elevated, which reduces the availability of 
credit. Research on recoveries that occur without an expansion of the supply of 
credit suggest that this increased risk aversion on the part of banks will stunt 
economic growth in the future as businesses and households are denied credit 
they would otherwise be eligible for.10  
 
While on aggregate, the contraction of the overall supply of credit via 
deleveraging is beneficial for the sustainability of economic growth, new credit is 
essential in order to finance investment and some elements of durable goods 
consumption. For government, the policy challenge is to ensure the mechanisms 
of financial intermediation remain active, while at the same time allowing the 
necessary process of deleveraging to continue. In this light, the announcement by 
the Minister for Finance that some €30 billion of credit would be available over 
the next 3 years is to be welcomed. This credit is essentially a rollover of part of 
€54 billion worth of expiring credit lines, but will be earmarked for domestic use 
rather than being used to reduce the exposure of the ECB and the Central Bank of 
Ireland. 
 
BOX 4: HOUSEHOLDS AND THE SAVINGS RATE  
The Irish savings rate has increased rapidly in recent years, rising from 1.5 per 
cent in 2007 to 11.7 per cent in 2010. The very low savings rate during the bubble 
years was indicative of the debt being accumulated by households, whereas the 
current elevated levels have depressed domestic demand.  
 
The savings rate is a term used to describe that portion of income that is not 
consumed, which includes both income that is converted into savings and income 
that is used to pay down debt. Whether Irish households are increasing their 
savings or decreasing their debts is an important question for policy formulation. 
If households are holding on to income in the form of savings, then policies that 
                                                            
10
  See Abiad, A. et al. (2011). “Creditless Recoveries” WP 11/58, IMF; Bijsterbosch, M. and Dahlhaus, T. (2011). 
“Determinants of Credit-less Recoveries” WP No. 1358, ECB; Coricelli, F. and Roland, I. (2011). “How do credit 
conditions shape economic recoveries?” Discussion Paper 8325, CEPR. 
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reduce uncertainty around future losses could help to stimulate consumption. 
However, if households are constrained by the need to pay down debt, they will 
be unable to respond to enticements to increase consumer expenditure. 
Consumption demand will only return when households have reduced debt to a 
level at which they feel comfortable to spend. 
 
In previous Commentaries we have noted that households have begun to 
deleverage in order to reduce their exposure to debt, citing evidence on 
outstanding household credit from the Central Bank’s Money and Banking 
statistics. Linking the contraction of the outstanding stock of credit with an 
increase in the savings rate is not straightforward. First, the two measures come 
from different data sources, so any relationship between them is purely 
illustrative. Second, changes in the monthly data for the outstanding stock of 
credit are comprised of transactions effects – which occur when credit is paid 
back or when new credit is availed of – and valuation effects – which include 
changes due to foreign exchange fluctuations, reclassifications and revaluation of 
the debt. Only changes due to transactions can provide evidence of deleveraging 
by the household sector. Table 10 gives the change in stock of credit outstanding 
in a particular year, as well as the change measured by cumulative monthly 
transactions in that year, and the valuations effects measured as the difference 
between the two. 
 
Table 10: Changes in Outstanding Credit, € million 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
     
Actual 15,748 -8,438 -4,491 -9,767 
Transactions 22,458 12,344 -1,631 -7,570 
Valuations -6,710 -20,782 -2,860 -2,197 
Source: Money and Banking Statistics, Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
 
 
The data show that household deleveraging has only been part of the story, and 
that valuation effects have had a larger impact since the current crisis began in 
2008 due to a large downward revaluation in that year. Data for 2010 as well as 
the first 6 months of 2011 indicate that deleveraging via transaction effects has 
since become the more dominant factor influencing the decline of the credit 
stock. 
 
The negative transactions data alone appear to be insufficient for explaining the 
increase in the savings rate. Therefore, we must consider also data on saving. 
Taking data on household deposit transactions from the Central Bank’s Money 
and Banking Statistics, it emerges that yearly growth in deposits held in domestic 
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institutions began to decline in 2007 and turned negative in 2010. However, this 
is not a surprising result given the waning confidence in the domestic banking 
system over this period. The household balance sheet from the Central Bank’s 
Quarterly Financial Account shows that household financial assets declined 
during in 2007 and 2008, but have increased in 2009 and 2010. Of the €18.3 
billion increase in financial assets, €8 billion was due to valuation effects, 
reflecting the recovery in global financial assets rather than the behaviour of 
households. Looking at the increased transactions, there was an increase of  
€6 billion in investment in insurance and pension assets, and €3.7 billion in 
investment in cash and deposits. The majority of this asset accumulation took 
place in 2009. Furthermore, there remains the possibility that financial assets of 
households have shifted abroad. There is indeed some evidence from the 
Quarterly Financial Accounts that the value Irish financial assets abroad increased 
during 2010, but it is unclear as to what extent this increase might accrue to 
households. 
 
Evidence of both asset accumulation and household deleveraging indicate that 
both processes are combining to generate a high savings rate. The impact 
appears to be of the same order of magnitude over the period 2009-2010, 
although there are differences in the time profile. Asset accumulation was 
greater in 2009 than in 2010, while deleveraging has gained momentum over 
time. 
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10. General Assessment 
 
 
In the Spring Quarterly Economic Commentary we described the economy as an 
economy in transition, with the focus shifting from domestic demand to export 
led demand, with indigenous firms playing an important role as they responded 
to the declines in domestic demand by seeking markets abroad. The data for 
2010 indicated that this shift was underway and the forecasts contained in this 
Commentary see this shift continuing. The danger for Ireland is that the advanced 
economies will go back into recession as this would dampen this export growth. 
We have no policy instrument that can influence this. The policy issue, given this 
very uncertain international environment, and the continued need for fiscal 
consolidation, is the extent to which indigenous firms’ competitiveness can be 
strengthened and the transition to an export led growth be speeded up. The 
transition process may be more difficult than previously anticipated, as there are 
four serious imbalances that must be addressed. 
 
Over the period 1999-2008 the economy experienced a major structural 
imbalance, as building and construction expanded beyond a sustainable level, 
fuelled by excessive lending by banks and excessive borrowing by households and 
the corporate sector. The need to rebalance the economy was and is reflected in 
a range of interconnected challenges. Ireland now faces a major structural 
unemployment problem in addition to a cyclical unemployment problem, a 
banking system that required restructuring, a private sector requiring 
restructuring of household and corporate debt, and public sector imbalances that 
require restructuring of the tax system and the pattern of expenditure across all 
heads of expenditure.  
 
Labour market restructuring: The level of unemployment is primarily structural, 
following the collapse of the Construction sector. In spite of the high level of 
unemployment there are shortages of some types of labour at present.  These 
shortages are affecting international services and the technical side of some 
multinational manufacturing companies; however, the numbers are small relative 
to the level of unemployment. Typically structural unemployment requires 
shifting workers from contracting sectors to growth sectors, retraining of workers 
and invariably cuts in real wages, or slower real wage growth.  
 
Bank restructuring: The collapse of the bubble exposed the poor financial state of 
the banking system’s balance sheet. Banks had borrowed heavily in the eurozone 
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wholesale money markets, which left them with real liabilities, but the 
corresponding assets were and still are of doubtful value. One purpose of NAMA 
was to determine the losses of the banking system so that banks could be put on 
a cleaner footing. This has necessitated very significant funding by government 
and losses by junior bondholders. The alternative is losses by depositors or by 
senior bondholders. It is claimed that within the eurozone, losses incurred by 
senior bondholders would have significant knock-on effects on other eurozone 
financial institutions. The ECB and EU authorities were and remain unwilling to 
countenance such losses across the eurozone. This is the logic behind the attempt 
to isolate the problem within countries (though it is clear that the problems of 
Ireland, Greece and Portugal are very different), but it is also the reason why the 
attempts to contain the problem to the countries are misguided, as the very 
interdependence that is the characteristic of a monetary union argues for a 
eurozone solution.  
 
Private Sector Restructuring:  The third area of restructuring now underway is 
within the private sector. Some elements of the corporate sector got involved in 
property development using the existing business as collateral. Losses on such 
property transactions may result in the sale of businesses that are sound so that 
the main effect is a change of ownership. This process needs to be accelerated, so 
that viable business can continue unencumbered by property debt, and property 
loans repaid in full or in part. The main hindrance is the poor functioning of the 
banking system. For the necessary restructuring to go ahead a financial 
intermediary is necessary between those with funds and those capable of 
operating a business. This may emerge over time, but would be better if forced 
liquidations were not the mechanism. We may need to rethink the processes 
whereby the necessary transfer of ownership takes place, particularly as 
government now effectively owns the banking system. Within the corporate 
sector the property development sector has suffered catastrophic losses, partly 
reflected in banking losses, but the mechanisms are in place (NAMA) to deal with 
this. Within the private sector the household sector is now engaged in a major 
deleveraging activity, increasing saving, and reducing indebtedness, but there are 
also still potential losses arising from negative equity holdings. The current 
approach is to deal with distressed mortgages on a case by case basis and this 
seems better than a uniform approach in that judgements can be made for 
differing circumstances. 
 
Public Finance Restructuring: In addition to this the collapse of the bubble has led 
to a very serious deterioration of the public finances quite independently of the 
bank restructuring costs. During the period of the bubble government revenue 
increased, leading to reductions in tax rates, removal of people from the tax net, 
new programmes of expenditure, increases in existing programmes and an 
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increase in wage rates throughout the public sector. The collapse in the bubble 
led immediately to a major deterioration in the public finances and government 
has been seeking to restore balance, both prior to and post the “troika” financing 
package. The public finance deterioration has led to further increase in net debt 
and this increase will continue for some years yet as the deficit is wound down. 
The reduction in the public finance deficit is proving difficult and has necessitated 
cuts in programmes and increased taxes and charges for services. It has also led 
to public sector pay cuts, the public sector pension levy (effectively a pay cut), 
lower rates of pay for new entrants, etc. As indicated earlier there are still more 
increases in taxes and charges for services as well as reduced expenditure as part 
of the fiscal consolidation process. 
 
The economy thus faces a series of major restructuring problems. These 
problems would admit of easier solutions if there was a resumption of growth in 
the economy. But growth is not a policy option – it is the outcome of policy 
changes. Output in the economy now seems to have stabilised, after three years 
of decline, though the first half of the year has been relatively flat with the 
private sector very cautious because of fears of upcoming tax and interest rate 
changes and the uncertainty in financial markets. The main positive feature of the 
last 18 months has been the growth in exports and in particular the growth in 
exports from indigenous/traditional companies.  
 
The policy issue is how to strengthen the shift to exports and improved 
competitiveness so that the economy can get on a faster growth path, with the 
external stimulus beginning to outweigh the demand deflationary budgetary 
measures. This is primarily a question of the cost base of firms, which is largely 
determined by the general price level as this impacts directly on wage and non-
wage costs, as material costs will tend to be uniform across markets. General 
consumer prices impact on wage inflation and wages are an important element of 
total costs. Thus policy should be directed to eliminating price distortions in 
markets. This requires very detailed work at a sectoral level and benchmarking 
against prices elsewhere. A reduction in the general price level will improve 
competitiveness directly and then indirectly through its effect on wage inflation 
and the wage level, making it much easier to effect a wage reduction relative to 
competitor countries. This effect is quite independent of the impact of lower 
comparative price and wage inflation that has already improved competitiveness. 
 
Finally, it is worth remembering that the personal savings rate has increased from 
very low levels of less than 1.5 per cent of disposable incomes during the boom 
to 11-12 per cent now. This has the same effect on domestic demand as a 
contractionary fiscal policy. Several reasons are given for this increase, but the 
modelling of these is poor at present so that we can only speculate. Some part 
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may be due to increased uncertainty in relation to future taxes. Government have 
indicated that they intend to set out, prior to the budget, the changes in taxation, 
charges for services and changes in expenditure over the next 2-3 years. This is to 
be welcomed as explicit numbers will enable the private sector to plan 
accordingly.  
 
Clearly as mentioned earlier some part of increased saving is an attempt by 
households to reduce their net indebtedness, built up excessively during the 
bubble. At some time households will reach a position when they are generally 
satisfied with their net debt position, when their spending will resume. The 
uncertainty now arising from financial market instability and the fears of a return 
to recession in the US and the UK have also had an adverse impact on spending 
patterns. This can only be resolved by policy elsewhere. The moves within the 
eurozone to resolve the financial crisis are slow, but now at least moving in the 
right direction, while the developed economies may have to accept that the 
recovery from the financial crisis will be slower than from a traditional recession.  
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The Macro-economic Impact of Changing the 
Rate of Corporation Tax 
Thomas Conefrey and **John FitzGerald 
The size and importance of the market services sector within the Irish economy 
has increased dramatically since the mid 1990s and the sector now accounts for a 
significant share of overall exports.  The rise in output and employment in market 
services coincided with the reduction in the corporation tax rate applicable to the 
sector from 40 per cent in 1994 to 12½ per cent in 2003. This low corporation tax 
regime was introduced for the manufacturing sector in the late 1950s. However, 
the exceptional growth in that sector peaked in the 1990s and thus the precise 
impact of the low tax rate for the manufacturing sector is not obvious. The 
extension of this low tax regime to the business and financial services sector after 
1994 constitutes a natural experiment which allows us to consider the before and 
after periods and to derive an estimate of the macroeconomic impact of this tax 
change.   
 
The analysis in our recent paper
†
 indicates that the reduction in the rate of 
corporation tax in the 1990s stimulated exports of services and, even allowing for 
profit repatriations by foreign firms and replacement of lost tax revenue, it 
resulted in an increase in domestic output. The increase in the profit rate in the 
business and financial services sector suggests that some of the increased output 
involved relocation of profits to Ireland by multinational firms. 
 
From 1989, the low manufacturing rate of corporation tax was extended to 
companies engaged in internationally traded financial services activities in the 
Irish Financial Services Sector (IFSC). In 1996, to comply with EU rules, the Irish 
government decided to move to apply a rate of 12½ per cent on corporate profits 
across all activities from 2003. This meant that the rate of corporation tax 
applicable to activity in the bulk of the business and financial services sector fell 
gradually from 40 per cent in 1994 to 32 per cent in 1998 and finally to 12½ per 
cent by 2003. This extended the attraction of Ireland for mobile firms in the 
business and financial services sector.  
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We developed a model of the business and financial services sector to derive an 
estimate of the final impact on output and tax revenue in Ireland of changes in 
the rate of corporation tax. In our new model of the business and financial 
services sector the output of the sector depends on overall world demand and on 
Ireland’s competitiveness, broadly defined.  
 
We analyse the impact of the tax change on the economy in a two-stage process. 
In the first stage, we consider the direct impact on the business and financial 
services sector. Our simulation results indicate that the reduction in the 
corporation tax rate from 40 per cent in 1993 to 12.5 per cent in 2003 had a 
significant long-run impact on the business and financial services sector. By 2005, 
exports, output, employment and tax revenue from the sector were significantly 
higher than they would have been without the tax change.  
 
This simulation does not allow for government action to offset any net change in 
corporate tax revenue and it takes no account of the knock-on effects of changes 
in this sector on the wider economy, such as its effect on wage inflation. In order 
to capture the wider macro-economic effects, and to test the robustness of the 
results from the small business and financial services sector model, this model is 
embedded in the HERMES macroeconomic model of the Irish economy in the 
second stage. 
 
The results from the modified HERMES model of the whole economy indicate 
that the substantial loss of tax revenue, consequent on the reduction in the 
corporation tax rate, required significantly higher taxes.  In the paper it is 
assumed that any loss of revenue from a reduction in corporation tax rates is 
made good through higher taxes on labour, leaving government borrowing 
unchanged. This rise in labour taxes caused wage rates to increase, which in turn 
offset some of the positive effects of the reduction in corporation tax on Ireland's 
external competitiveness. Nonetheless the change in the corporate tax regime is 
estimated to have had a positive effect on overall output and employment in the 
economy. Our results also suggest that the reduction in the corporation tax rate 
gave rise to the relocation to Ireland of a substantial amount of profits through 
transfer pricing.   
 
†
 Conefrey, T., FitzGerald, J. 2011. The Macro-economic Impact of Changing the Rate of Corporation 
Tax. Economic Modelling, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 991-999. 
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The Banking Sector and Recovery in the EU 
Economy† 
Ray Barrell , Tatiana Fic, John FitzGerald , Ali Orazgani and Rachel 
Whitworth 
The financial crisis of the last three years has seen a dramatic change in the EU 
financial sector. Since the early 1990s, with the completion of the internal 
market, there had been a growing trend towards an EU financial services market. 
Banks were becoming more international with greater regional coverage within 
the EU (and the world) resulting in a more efficient use of capital in the EU 
economy and enhanced competition. The benefit of this growth in “European” 
banks was expected to arise from both efficiency gains within the sector and also 
from a more efficient allocation of capital across wider European economy, all 
leading to higher growth. Experience has shown that the expected changes in the 
banking sector within the EU did, in fact, translate into welfare benefits for 
consumers in the period prior to the current crisis.  
 
Since the 1980s similar changes were also taking place in the US. As a result of 
the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s there was a concern in the US that banks, 
which were confined to single states, were more at risk from idiosyncratic shocks 
affecting individual states. This prudential concern for geographical diversification 
seems to have been less of an issue within the EU in the move towards financial 
integration. 
 
As a result of the completion of the EU internal market, banks within Europe have 
become larger and more international. However, the current financial crisis has 
seen the collapse of some banks within the EU and many more banks have been 
either partly or fully nationalised because of their inability to deal with their 
losses. Because of the national basis of banking regulation within the EU it has 
fallen to individual member governments to rescue “their own” banks rendering 
the EU banking system more “national”. This contrasts with the situation in the 
 
 r.barrell@niesr.ac.uk   
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US where banking regulation was a Federal responsibility and where there has 
been no move to return to a system of smaller “State” banks. This paper shows 
that the result of the EU approach to dealing with the financial crisis has been a 
greater concentration of banks on their “home” markets and a decline in 
participation by domestic banks in foreign markets. This will reduce the average 
scale of banks in many economies, especially in the smaller economies.  
 
We have used a micro data set to investigate the impact of size on banks’ net 
interest margin and have shown that larger banks have smaller spreads between 
borrowing and lending rates for firms and households, while smaller banks 
generally charge more for their loans. As we have competition between deposit 
takers this largely reflects the fact that larger banks charge their borrowers less. 
Lower borrowing costs for households results in higher incomes, consumption 
and investment in housing. Lower borrowing costs for firms results in higher 
investment and, hence, a higher capital stock. Taken together the result of lower 
borrowing costs is higher sustainable national output. 
 
Having established the inverse relationship between bank size and the net 
interest margin we then consider the implications of the changes in the EU 
banking system for growth in the EU economy. Three factors affect the long-run 
impact of this change in the structure of the banking system on output. First, 
countries with a higher capital-output ratio are more affected: Germany, which 
has a more capital intensive economy than France is, as a result, likely to be more 
affected than France. Second, countries with a greater dependence on the 
banking sector than on equity to fund business investment are also more likely to 
be affected. Third, the effects are likely to be largest in small countries because of 
their dependence on bank funding and because the shock to their banking 
systems is larger.  
 
Given these estimates of the size of the likely change in the bank margin and, 
therefore, in borrowing costs, we then look at the possible impact of the 
reduction in bank size on sustainable output in the Euro Area countries. We do 
this using the NIESR global macro-economic model, NiGEM. We first investigate 
the impact on output in large and small countries showing that the effects are 
generally larger in small countries, and also larger in economies that are more 
dependent on bank finance for their business investment decisions. If the recent 
increase in sovereign spreads propagates into the banking system of peripheral 
economies this will result in significantly lower growth than would otherwise be 
the case in Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy. However, in the case of 
Ireland a substantial share of domestic output is accounted for by multinational 
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companies, both foreign and national. These firms are not dependent on the Irish 
capital markets (including banks) to fund their activities and, hence, should be 
less affected by a higher cost of domestic funding. However, smaller domestically 
owned firms in Ireland will suffer the full adverse effects of the increase in 
margins.  
 
Generally, the model results suggest that an illustrative one percentage point 
increase in borrowing costs would cut Euro area output by ½ per cent within four 
years and by ¾ of a per cent in the long run.  If the growth over the last three 
years in government borrowing costs compared to Germany persists, and if these 
increased spreads propagate themselves into the largely nationalised banking 
system of high debtor countries, this will cause a sharp slowdown in activity. The 
impact will be particularly felt in Greece, and to a lesser extent in Spain, Portugal, 
Ireland and Italy. While Euro area growth would be 0.1 or 0.2 lower for a couple 
of years with an illustrative one percentage point increase in borrowing, under 
these circumstances output growth in Greece might be 1 ½ percent lower than it 
would have been for three years. 
 
A more “national” and fragmented banking system within the EU will have 
broader implications for the financing of economic activity in Europe. Larger 
firms, especially multinational firms would be favoured over smaller firms 
because of their ability to access capital markets directly (through corporate 
bonds) and also because they have access to the banking sectors in the different 
jurisdictions in which they operate. Small and medium sized enterprises, and 
especially households, which are more dependent on the domestic banking 
system will be most affected. The different approaches to dealing with the 
financial crisis in the EU and the US will also probably favour growth in the US 
economy in the medium term. 
 
†
Ray Barrell, Tatiana Fic, John FitzGerald, Ali Orazgani and Rachel Whitworth, 2011, “The Banking 
Sector and Recovery in the EU economy”, National Institute Economic Review, No. 216, April 2011, 
pp. R41-R52. 
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Should We Be Worried About Income Inequality 
in Ireland?  
Richard Layte 
Despite the recession Ireland remains a country with relatively high income 
inequality. Ireland sits just behind the UK near the top of the inequality rankings 
in Europe behind the Baltic and Southern European states. Is this a problem? 
Should we be concerned about levels of income inequality in Irish society? 
Debates about this issue often centre on the moral acceptability of income 
inequality with protagonists adopting well worn ideological positions but is there 
actually any evidence that higher levels of income inequality are a problem? 
Some may have moral misgivings about excessively high incomes at the top and 
those at the bottom being left behind as middle incomes increase, but does 
inequality in itself, as opposed to being poor, actually have any consequences? 
Recent ESRI research suggests that the answer is yes.  
 
First, it should be made clear that having less income is bad for your health. There 
is ample evidence for Ireland that those with less income, education or from a 
lower social class have a lower life expectancy and poorer health while alive. This 
‘health gradient’ is not just between those at the bottom and everyone else. 
Those in the top income or class grouping have better health and a higher life 
expectancy than those just below them and the pattern is repeated all the way to 
the bottom. But social scientists have also found that high income inequality at 
the country level also lowers life expectancy, health and well-being. Even the 
wealthy appear to die younger in more unequal societies. For many years it was 
argued by some that the association was just a statistical artefact but in the last 
decade a growing literature using increasingly sophisticated data and 
methodology has shown that income inequality has a detrimental effect not only 
on health and life expectancy but a range of other troubling social issues 
including low educational performance in schools, rates of teenage pregnancy, 
levels of obesity, even the ‘agreeableness’ of the population. What unites these 
phenomena and why does inequality have these effects?  
 
 
 richard.layte@esri.ie 
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One part of the answer was provided in a recent paper by Richard Layte
†
 which 
used data on 35,000 people from 30 countries in Europe to examine the 
association between income inequality and mental well-being. As with physical 
health and life expectancy, high income inequality is associated with less mental 
health and well-being and the research set out to test different theories about 
what explained the association. Past research has suggested that higher 
inequality is damaging because it precipitates feelings of inferiority and shame 
that are damaging to health and poisonous to social relationships. People who 
feel inferior or disrespected are more hostile and less trusting of others 
intentions. This makes them less likely to help others and so less likely to work 
together and cooperate within a community. Feelings of shame and hostility have 
an individual cost in terms of mental and physical health but they are also highly 
toxic to social cohesion in a society because collective action and social efficacy 
require trust between individuals.  
 
This research by Richard Layte shows that more unequal societies do indeed 
appear to precipitate more feelings of social inferiority. In more unequal societies 
people, even those at the top of the income pile, are more likely to feel that 
others look down on them. This same relationship holds for individual measures 
of social trust. More affluent people trust more but even affluent people are less 
likely to trust in more unequal societies and these relationships hold even if we 
control for a number of individual characteristics. Does this perceived inferiority 
and distrust matter? The research paper summarised here suggests it does, 
presenting evidence that these factors explain the lower levels of mental well-
being in more unequal countries which contribute to higher levels of mental 
illness.  
 
Debate about the rights and wrongs of Ireland’s high level of inequality have 
been ongoing for a long time but perhaps it is time to move the debate forward 
and discuss the evidence about the effect of inequality on individuals, families 
and the society at large. It Is often argued that inequality is necessary to provide 
the economic incentives for the hard work which creates economic growth and 
higher incomes for all. The fact that in Europe, the more equal countries are 
actually richer on average (see Figure 1) suggests not. Moreover, research has 
consistently shown that the disadvantage of poor children relative to their 
affluent peers in terms of mobility up the income distribution is stronger in the 
highly unequal US than in more equal European societies. Inequality it seems 
stacks the odds against poorer children succeeding. Debate on income inequality 
in Ireland needs to be informed by such evidence.  
 
 58 
 
 
Country GDP per Capita in PPS by Income Inequality (GINI) 
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Investing in Child Health and Development: The 
Impact of Breastfeeding on Children’s School 
Performance 
Cathal McCrory and Richard Layte 
There is now strong evidence that breastfed babies are less prone to stomach 
upsets, ear infections and the coughs and colds of early childhood than their 
bottle fed peers. There is also a growing body of evidence that breastfeeding may 
confer more long term benefits for child development. For example, studies have 
consistently shown that breastfed children score more highly on cognitive and 
academic performance tests in later life compared with those who were bottle-
fed. At first glance the explanation seems simple: breast milk contains nutrients 
that improve brain development during infancy leading to longer-term gains in 
cognitive performance. The story may not be so simple however. Research shows 
that children who are breastfed are more likely to come from more advantaged 
households, that is, those with higher levels of education, higher income and 
social class. This means that these children enjoy other economic and 
environmental advantages and it may well be that it is these factors, not the 
breast milk itself, that explains the higher ability scores among the breastfed.      
 
Recent research carried out by the ESRI (McCrory & Layte 2011)
†
 has sought to 
shed some light on this issue using data from the Child Cohort of the Growing Up 
in Ireland project, a study of 8,568 nine-year-old children whose development is 
being followed over time. The children’s parents were asked whether their child 
was ever breastfed as an infant and the duration of this breastfeeding in weeks. 
The children also completed the Drumcondra reading and maths tests. More 
importantly, the Growing Up in Ireland study also collects a large number of other 
measures of the families’ social and economic situation providing the information 
necessary to identify the specific effect of being breastfed.  
 
The study found that children who were breastfed scored almost 9 points higher 
on the reading and 7 points higher on the maths tests compared to those who 
were bottle-fed. More persuasively, the study also found that test scores 
improved with the amount of breastfeeding which the child had experienced 
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although the benefits peak after around 6 months of breastfeeding. However, it 
also showed that there was a strong association between breastfeeding and the 
socio-economic characteristics of the household such as the mother’s level of 
education, household social class, household income, and the number of 
children’s books in the home.  For instance, about three quarters of those who 
were university educated breastfed compared with a quarter of those who had a 
lower secondary education or less.  
 
The question is: does the effect of breastfeeding remain once we remove the 
effect of the child’s family background? The research showed that it does. 
Although the gain from breastfeeding dropped to 3.2 percentage points on 
reading and 2.2 percentage points on mathematics, these differences are 
statistically significant. Breastfeeding for a longer time did not have a statistically 
identifiable advantage. 
 
The results quantify the benefits which being breastfed in early life has for child 
educational development but could this effect vary across children? Those 
coming from more affluent homes have a number of advantages that contribute 
to educational development aside from breastfeeding so we may see less of an 
effect for these children. On the other hand, the effect may be largest for the 
most disadvantaged children. This is precisely what the study found. The test 
score advantage of breastfeeding was largest among the most socially 
disadvantaged where it averaged 7 percentage points on reading and 4 
percentage points on maths. Among the most advantaged breastfeeding 
improved scores by around 1 percentage point on both the reading and maths 
test.  
 
The advantages of breastfeeding for health in childhood are already well 
established but this study shows that breast feeding is also very important for the 
child’s long term development. This result underlines the importance of 
encouraging and facilitating mothers to breastfeed where at all possible for the 
first six months of the child’s life, particularly among women with less education 
or in lower income groups whose children have the most to gain. This task is all 
the more important as Ireland has the lowest breastfeeding rate in Europe. 
Around half of women giving birth in Irish hospitals are breastfeeding their child 
48 hours after birth. This is true of between 75 and 95% of women in most other 
European countries (http://www.europeristat.com/bm.doc/european-perinatal-
health-report.pdf, p82).  
 
Not all women will be able to breastfeed their child.  Demonising mothers who 
cannot or choose not to would be counterproductive but identifying and sharing 
evidence as to the advantages of breastfeeding can play a positive role in 
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persuading women of the benefits. Non-Irish women giving birth in Irish hospitals 
are twice as likely to breastfeed as Irish women and this suggests that attitudes 
toward breastfeeding are important in shaping behaviour. But, it is also 
important to provide an environment which is supportive of women who want to 
if we are serious about increasing breastfeeding levels in Ireland.  
 
 
 
†
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